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The Moderating Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaty Stringency on the 
Relationship between Political Instability and Subsidiary Ownership Choice 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
We investigate whether the degree to which a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) protects against 
expropriation (i.e., its “stringency”) influences the international strategy of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) as they invest in countries with varying levels of political instability. We 
draw on institutional logic and insights from political economics to hypothesize that BIT 
stringency will moderate the established positive relationship between host country political 
instability and minority ownership. Analysis of a sample of 289 foreign investments made by 
AEX-listed Dutch MNEs in 34 countries between 2004-2013 provides support: a more stringent 
BIT will encourage the MNE to choose a majority stake as political instability rises. Robustness 
tests provide further support for our argument. The results have both managerial and policy 
implications relating to the role that BIT stringency plays in determining MNE strategy. 
 
 
Key Words: political instability, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), subsidiary ownership 
choice 
 
  
  
3 
1. Introduction 
Developed industrialized countries can use bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to protect 
the rights of their companies as they invest in uncertain markets. Developing and emerging 
countries, on the other hand, sign BITs in order to attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(Neumayer & Spess, 2005) and compete for a share of the world’s FDI (Elkins, Guzman, & 
Simmons, 2006). Political uncertainty in host countries renders BITs useful as a source of 
information about the treatment of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and protection of their 
assets in such countries.  
Scholars have argued that BITs can mitigate political instability by offering credible and 
enforceable international legal protection of foreign investors’ rights (Mulchinski, 1995; 
Raghavan, 1997; Rosendorff & Shin, 2015; Sornarajah, 2004; Wälde, 2005). There is a growing 
evidence that the presence of BITs encourages FDI and reduces the likelihood that host 
governments will engage in policies harmful to MNEs (e.g., Desbordes &Vicard, 2009; Elkins, 
Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014; Neumayer & Spess, 2005).  However, 
research on this has yielded mixed and conflicting results (Kerner, 2009). Subsequently, scholars 
have begun to question how the content of BITs influences FDI across countries (Anzorena & 
Perry, 2010; Berger, Busse, Nunnenkamp & Roy, 2010). 
Unfortunately, answers to the question of how the design and content of BITs influence 
MNE strategy have not yet been provided by international business (IB) research. There is little 
empirical evidence on how BIT provisions may be associated with MNE market entry strategy. 
Research on the institutional determinants of MNE strategy in the field of IB has mainly focused 
on other country-level institutional conditions that influence MNE internationalization decisions. 
Examples of these include: legal restrictions on FDI in the host country that influence use of joint 
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ventures (Brouthers, 2002), how institutional progress in transition economies is related to MNEs 
choosing full ownership modes (Meyer, 2001), and the impact of institutional distance between 
home and host country on joint venture formation (Gaur & Lu, 2007). The IB literature on 
international strategy does not, by and large, include treatment of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) such as BITs in theoretical or empirical work
1
. De Villa, Rajwani and Lawton 
(2015) recently noted the absence of focus on multi-levels of the political environment in market 
entry studies. 
In this study, we address this research gap and build on recent research highlighting the 
content of IIAs as a determinant of FDI (Berger et al., 2010; Büthe & Milner, 2014; UNCTAD, 
2014) as opposed to the mere presence of such agreements. More specifically, we investigate the 
impact of BIT stringency on ownership choice. We define BIT stringency as the degree to which 
the provisions within the BIT agreement legally protect signatory-country investors against 
expropriation. Some BITs are more protective of foreign investors than others in terms of types 
of potential expropriation (direct and/or indirect, i.e., creeping expropriation) (Wei, 2015), 
flexibility of investment dispute settlement mechanisms, compensation for expropriation, and 
other expropriation provisions (Lukoianova, 2013). BITs also differ in terms of whether they 
allow dispute resolution through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) (Allee & Peinhardt, 2010). 
 BIT stringency is a critical aspect of the broader international institutional environment 
that guides subsidiary ownership choice, particularly in politically-unstable countries. This paper 
offers an argument explaining the impact of BIT stringency on subsidiary ownership choice 
under differing levels of political instability. By drawing on institutional theory and recent 
                                                        
1
 One recent exception is Jandhyala and Weiner (2014), who demonstrate how MNEs place a higher value on 
foreign assets protected by international investment agreements than those that are not protected at an international 
level. 
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insights from international political economy (IPE) research, we hypothesize an indirect 
influence of BIT stringency on subsidiary ownership choice: at higher levels of political 
instability, a “stringency” effect comes into play that provides much needed “reassurance power” 
regarding international asset protection, inducing investing firms to choose majority ownership 
over – what would otherwise be - minority ownership. To date, there have been no empirical 
studies of the contingent relationship between BIT stringency, political instability, and 
ownership choice. Our empirical analysis is based on 289 foreign investments made by AEX-
listed Dutch MNEs between 2004 and 2013 into 34 countries with which The Netherlands had a 
ratified BIT. Controlling for a range of firm-, country- and industry- factors, we find support for 
our hypothesis. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature on MNE internationalization strategy in 
two important ways. First, we explain the linkages between the design elements (BIT stringency) 
of an institutional arrangement at the international level (as opposed to a domestic institutional 
arrangement within the borders of one country) and MNE international strategy. Secondly, we 
advance understanding of how international institutions and country-level conditions interact by 
examining the impact of BIT stringency on MNE choices as levels of political instability vary 
across host-country environments. To our knowledge, our research is the first study to examine 
the role of BIT stringency in this way. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Host country policy uncertainty and subsidiary ownership choice 
 Scholars have argued there is a strong impact of uncertainty in host-country policy on 
subsidiary ownership choice in the country; the greater the uncertainty, the more likely an 
  
6 
investing MNE will choose minority ownership as opposed to a majority ownership or a wholly 
owned subsidiary (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Why is this? A country exhibiting a strong regulatory 
institutional environment, that is, fundamental legal ground rules that are stable, transparent and 
enforced, inspires confidence in the country’s investment environment, such that economic 
activities that occur within its borders can flourish (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Li & Zahra, 2013). 
Contracts can be enforced; transgressors can be pursued in a functioning court of law. In such 
politically-stable environments, government leaders have a limited ability to make abrupt and 
discriminatory policy changes that might adversely influence MNE strategy (Wei, 2015). In such 
an environment, external uncertainty -- exogenous to the firm -- is diminished.  
 When it comes to more unstable countries – such as those in the developing world and at 
the transitional periphery (Wood & Demirbag, 2015) - the impact of politics is more prominent. 
Political systems represent agents of institutional change in such countries (Henisz, 2002; Peng, 
2003). When political instability arises, the potential exists for an unexpected change in the set of 
external forces that influence the MNE’s investment in the country. As noted by Eden and Molot 
(2002), MNEs “actively attempt to shape government policies toward their industry” (Eden and 
Molot, 2002: 367). Instability in the political environment of a host country increases the 
likelihood of corresponding turmoil in this policy environment (Peng, 2003). In the presence of 
political instability, an investing MNE then will face a greater challenge in its ongoing 
bargaining discussion with numerous actors in the host country (Henisz & Zelner, 2005) as it 
prepares for investment. As MNEs engage in bargaining in this type of environment, political 
actors can “overturn, alter or re-interpret emerging institutions” (Henisz & Zelner, 2005: 373) at 
short notice. Government actions also can attempt to alter the distribution of wealth by means of 
nationalization, taxation, and money supply regulations. In this context, bargaining becomes 
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troublesome because politicians can be “ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory, in driving 
economic reform agendas” (Wood & Demirbag, 2015: 1). In other words, the lack of checks and 
balances associated with political instability will reinforce the possibility that regulations 
themselves will be hard to predict and invested assets harder to protect. Abrupt changes in the 
political environment can cause potential financial loss for firms, as well (Henisz, 2000).  
Research has highlighted the vulnerability of MNEs in these circumstances (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch, & Steen, 2010).  
Choosing minority ownership can alleviate these concerns by improving the MNE’s 
ability to learn about emerging (and changing) institutions while limiting commitment (Pak & 
Park, 2004; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Indeed, several studies have reached similar conclusions on 
the relationship between political uncertainty and subsidiary ownership choice (Brouthers, 2002; 
Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). 
 
2.2 Content of bilateral investment treaties 
We argue that this relationship between political instability and subsidiary ownership choice will 
be moderated by the content of any international investment agreement (IIA) – such as a BIT - 
between the home and host country, in particular, the content associated with the protection of 
international investments. We focus on BITs as they are the most prevalent form of bi-lateral 
investment agreement although our argument may apply also to other forms of international 
investment agreement such as investment provisions in regional economic institutions. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there are 
currently 2,279 ratified BITs in force, compared to 280 other forms of IIA between countries 
(UNCTAD, 2015). It has recently been argued that more autocratic countries – with much to 
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gain from FDI - will sign BITs to add credibility to investment promises they make to outside 
investors (Rosendorff & Shin, 2015). As noted by Wei (2015): “Bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) regulate the exercise of the state’s power to expropriate investments” (Wei, 2015: 579). 
Scholars have noted divergence in the content of BITs across all types of countries 
(Berger et al., 2010; Sachs & Sauvant, 2009; Sornarajah, 2004). In other words, not all BITs are 
the same. Freyer and Herlihy (2005) observed that “[s]ome states are…more explicit when 
drafting and negotiating new investment treaties” (Freyer & Herlihy, 2005: 83, footnote 89). 
Differences in the content of BITs arise because of the different motives that stakeholders have 
for developing provisions within a BIT. While BITs were historically concluded between capital-
abundant advanced industrialized countries and capital-scarce developing countries (Sornarajah 
2004), there has been an increase in BITs between developing countries. A capital-exporting 
advanced industrialized country will attempt to increase, as much as possible, international rights 
protection for their investors through BITs. Developing and emerging countries, on the other 
hand, despite competition for a share of global FDI (Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006), will 
attempt to keep their sovereign rights as much as possible to control FDI on their territory.  
BITs differ in terms of the inclusion and strength of investment provisions (Berger et al., 
2010), the number of obligations specified, the scope of their coverage, and the amount of details 
the obligations provide on every issue (e.g., Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Sornarajah, 2004). Some 
BITs are more stringent than others. BIT stringency will be higher when the content of the BIT 
offers better protection against unforeseen and damaging events, including expropriation of 
assets. The content of a BIT is the result of a rigorous analysis undertaken not only by 
government officials in each country, but also by domestic business representatives with interests 
in the countries. Often a non-binding Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) is 
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signed, under which two countries create a joint council responsible for the identification and 
discussion of all pertinent investment issues. This allows corporations an opportunity to express 
their concerns and demands regarding particular BITs. After signing, both countries have to 
follow domestic procedures to ratify BITs. Without ratification, a BIT has no legal force to 
protect foreign investors in a host country (Yackee, 2009). 
Researchers, predominantly in IPE, have only recently begun to examine the links 
between the content of international investment agreements and FDI outcomes. Büthe and 
Milner (2014) examined FDI flows into 122 developing countries and showed that stronger 
mechanisms for credible commitment in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) induced FDI. 
Berger et al. (2010) used a four-value ordinal variable to capture the strength of provisions in 
BITs and regional trade agreements (RTAs)
1
. While these authors find a positive relationship 
between liberal admission rules
2
 in RTAs and FDI, their findings in respect of BIT provisions 
influencing FDI are inconclusive
3
. In addition, UNCTAD has noted that substantive treaty 
provisions lie behind the FDI impact of international agreements between countries (UNCTAD, 
2014). While these recent studies suggest that the content of IIAs can play a role in FDI 
decisions, there has been no research on this in the MNE strategy literature. 
 
2.3 The indirect impact of BIT stringency on subsidiary ownership choice 
We assert that the level of BIT stringency will moderate the relationship between 
political instability and subsidiary ownership choice. Scholars note that IIAs such as BITs signal 
                                                        
1
 This variable ranged from 0 for weakest (country pairs not bound by any national treatment obligation) to 3 for 
strongest (agreements with a detailed list of ways in which a host country may discriminate against a foreign 
investor) (see Berger et al., 2010, p.7)  
2
 Liberal admission provisions “restrict the ability of host governments to discriminate with respect to the admission 
of foreign investments” (Berger et al., 2010, p.1) 
3
 Berger et al. (2010) report GMM estimations that show a positive relation between BITs without national treatment 
provisions and FDI at the 10% level 
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credible commitment by a host country to protect rights of foreign investors. Private economic 
actors seek credible commitment when entering a host country, a commitment being credible if 
the actor believes it is rational for other actors “to do what they say they will” (Martin, 2000; 14; 
Büthe & Milner, 2014: 91). Credibility in this sense refers to “expectations about the future 
actions of strategic actors” (Diermeier et al., 1997: 22), and commitments become more or less 
credible “depending on the magnitude of the costs imposed on future deviations from the 
promised actions” (Diermeier et al., 1997: 23). Credible commitments “raise ex post costs of 
non-compliance above those that might be incurred in the absence of a treaty” (Elkins et al., 
2006: 823). In addition to legal costs and potential compensation payments through an 
international arbitration tribunal, further costs for the host country in the event of non-
compliance can include reduction in future inward FDI, making future co-operation with MNEs 
more difficult and reputational damage (Elkins et al., 2006; Büthe & Milner, 2014) This line of 
argument and supporting empirical evidence indicate that investors do take the presence of these 
agreements into account when preparing for FDI (Büthe & Milner, 2014). Observers have noted 
how foreign investors can implement risk-management strategic planning using BITs (Anzorena 
& Perry, 2010). Sachs and Sauvant (2009: lv) note that firms “deliberately seek the protection of 
a treaty” when they engage in treaty shopping. Other scholars argue that while investors may not 
necessarily refer to BITs when making location choices, they will do so in the potential event of 
a dispute (Poulsen, 2010). 
We argue that the more stringent the content of the BIT, the more credible it will be in 
deterring adverse government actions, all else equal, as a result of political instability in a host 
country. While the presence of a BIT can induce compliance by clarifying the commitment, 
involving the home country government and enhancing enforcement (Elkins, Guzman & 
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Simmon, 2006: 823; Rosendorff & Shin, 2015), the stringency of a BIT will determine the 
strength of credibility in the commitment to protect property rights of foreign investors. It will do 
this by raising greater ex post costs for the host country than would otherwise be incurred in the 
event that a host country does not comply with the BIT’s stipulations. The investing MNE 
receives a stronger guarantee ex ante and in writing about the conditions under which a third-
party international dispute mechanism would be triggered if contractual disagreements arise at 
some time in the future. While some BITs (such as the Peru-China BIT) regulate against direct 
expropriation, as noted by Wei (2015), some BITs go further and regulate also against indirect 
and creeping expropriation. Büthe and Milner (2014) refer to this increase in stringency in terms 
of clauses that have a greater “reassurance power” for the investing MNE. 
As the level of political instability in a host country increases, the need for sources of 
such reassurance power surrounding any proposed MNE investment will increase. The MNE will 
be alert to the potential adverse consequences of increasing political instability and will seek out 
reassurance that any investment will be protected. As political instability rises, the MNE will 
seek comfort in what is essentially an increasingly uncomfortable investment situation. 
Consequently, the impact of BIT stringency on the relationship between political instability and 
ownership will be determined by the requirement for such reassurance power over and above that 
which is received by other sources of reassurance, including the mere presence of any BIT.  This 
reassurance power of BIT stringency is all the more pertinent because BIT content is a 
manifestation of the interests of forceful interest groups (namely the home and host country 
governments, as well as international courts of arbitration) while representing a category of 
‘checks and balance’ (in Henisz & Zellner’s (2005) terms) that will dampen the impact of 
political instability on abrupt and potentially damaging changes for foreign investors. 
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In these circumstances we expect a more stringent BIT to offer greater reassurance and 
protection to investing MNEs, providing them with encouragement that majority ownership in 
the face of abruptly changing national institutions is still viable (Büthe and Milner, 2014). 
Looking at this from the opposite angle, as political instability decreases, the need for additional 
reassurance power through BIT stringency will diminish. MNEs will need less protection against 
potential expropriations and the threat of hostile government confiscation of assets is lower. We 
therefore propose an interaction effect, stated as follows: BIT stringency will moderate the 
positive relationship between host country political instability and likelihood of choosing 
minority ownership: as political instability increases in a host country that has ratified a BIT 
with the home country, BIT stringency will reduce the likelihood that MNEs will choose minority 
ownership in that country. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
We collected data on new foreign investments made by 22 MNEs listed on the Dutch 
AEX index (Amsterdam Exchange Index) in 2004 and continued to pool the data on these 
companies over the ten-year period 2004-2013 inclusive. The new investments were strategic 
investments outside the Netherlands that were not simply an equity extension of a previous 
equity investment in a given location in a host country. For the current study, we selected those 
made in host countries where there was a ratified BIT in place between The Netherlands and the 
host country. We note that sample countries included a range of developing as well as some 
newly industrialized countries. This allowed us to obtain adequate variance in political 
instability. The 34 countries in the sample that satisfied these criteria are shown in Table 1 
categorized by their World Bank Governance Indicator percentile rank for political stability. 
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---------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 Dutch businesses have had a long history of internationalization, starting with Dutch 
traders in colonial times, right up to the present day (Wilkins, 2005). The Netherlands is a small, 
but globally open, economy, and, according to the UNCTAD International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, currently has BITs ratified with 96 countries (UNCTAD, 2014). Against 
the backdrop of the recent global financial crisis, Dutch firms are increasingly shifting focus 
towards developing and emerging countries (Holland Trade, 2014). The Netherlands was also 
one of the world’s top ten countries in terms of numbers of BITs in 2007 (Sachs & Sauvant, 
2009). These features made The Netherlands an ideal country to target as the home country for 
sampling. AEX-listed MNEs were chosen for this study because: (1) as large MNEs they have 
widespread international operations and are active in a range of host countries; (2) AEX-listed 
MNEs’ annual reports are audited and contain their most important and strategic foreign 
investments clearly reported. The reports were obtained from corporate websites. Previous 
researchers of MNE internationalization have used company reports as the main data source 
(e.g., Gatignon & Anderson, 1988).  
To enhance reliability, we used press releases from the sampled MNEs in order to 
identify ownership in ambiguous cases. Observations that remained unclear or were considered 
to be very small portfolio holdings were not included in the final sample. The final sample size 
was n=289, corresponding to an average of 28.9 new foreign investments per year.
1
 
Dependent variable. We coded two ownership structure choices: majority ownership (1) and 
minority ownership (0) (Chen, 2008). Where the equity stake was explicitly reported, we treated 
                                                        
1
 The distribution of observations over the ten years was as follows (number of observations and percent of total 
sample in parenthesis): 2004 (n=30, 10.4%), 2005 (n=32, 11.1%), 2006 (n=53, 18.3%), 2007 (n=42, 14.5%), 2008 
(n=47, 16.6%), 2009 (n=3, 0.7%), 2010 (n=12, 4.2%), 2011 (n=37, 12.8%), 2012 (n=14, 4.8%), 2013 (n=19, 6.6%). 
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majority ownership as 51% or greater stake. We follow previous researchers such as Filatotchev, 
Stephan & Jindra (2008) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1997).  Filatotchev, Stephan & Jindra 
(2008) use “a dummy variable for the foreign investor’s ownership above the controlling 
threshold of 51%” (p. 1140). Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) define majority ownership as greater 
than 50%. Ramaswamy, Gomes and Veliyath (1998) state that 51% or greater represents “a 
pattern of ownership indicating majority control” (Ramaswamy, Gomes, & Veliyath, 1998: 437). 
Our approach here is also consistent with the narrative on ownership of foreign investments 
given in the annual reports we reviewed. For example, TNT Express defined subsidiaries as 
those entities where the firm had control over financial and operating policies, “generally 
accompanying a shareholding of more than one-half of the voting rights” (TNT Express, 2013: 
78). Similarly, ArcelorMittal referred to a 55% stake in Belgo Bekaert Arames (Brazil) as a 
“controlling stake” (ArcelorMittal, 2013: 80). Any unclear or ambiguous cases which could not 
be clarified by reference to press releases were left out.  
Independent variables.  We operationalized political instability using the World Governance 
Indicator for political stability and absence of violence, reverse coded (Globerman & Shapiro, 
2003; Knack & Keefer, 1995). This indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, from the 
frequency of violent demonstrations, social unrest, conflicts of an ethnic, religious or regional 
nature, to whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat. The theoretical range is 
from -2.5 (highest instability) to +2.5 (highest stability). We reverse coded the variable so that it 
captured political instability. The actual range in the data is from -1.11 to 2.11. 
We used a new measure for BIT stringency that captures the degree of legal protection 
from expropriation (Lukoianova, 2013). Appendix 1 provides technical details on how BIT 
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stringency was calculated. The degree of protection from expropriation is measured as the cosine 
similarity measure between every BIT ratified between the Netherlands and the host country and 
the BIT of a chosen benchmark (or a measurement standard) of a maximum legal protection for a 
foreign investor from expropriation. We used the cosine similarity measure over the alternatives 
(Jaccard’s coefficient, Sorensen's coefficient, and Ochiai's coefficient) as it has been 
demonstrated as one of the “top performing” similarity measures for text document clustering 
(Strehl, Ghosh, & Mooney, 2000). Research in natural language processing has also 
demonstrated advantages of using the cosine coefficient to identify whether two text units are 
more or less similar in their context (Jurafsky & Martin, 2008; Manning & Schutze, 1999).  By 
using the cosine measure, we followed established protocol: “two objects are similar if their 
corresponding vectors point in the same direction (i.e., they have roughly the same set of features 
and in the same proportion), regardless of their actual length” (Rasmussen & Karypis, 2004: 4). 
We used QDA Miner software from Provalis Research for the management of the qualitative 
manual coding of the BITs, and subsequent calculations of the cosine similarity measures. 
Appendix 2 provides examples of BIT provision text for three countries included in the 
analysis. A less stringent BIT with the Netherlands would be the case of Turkey and a more 
stringent BIT would be the case of Costa Rica. In this example, the expropriation provision in 
Costa Rica’s BIT includes stricter wording around payment for loss, referring to the need for a 
settlement date and interest.  
Control variables. At the host-country level we used an indicator of rules that encourage FDI, 
cultural distance between home and host countries, host country market size and economic 
development as control variables. We also used a dichotomous dummy variable to capture 
whether the MNE had previously invested in the host country in a separate investment within the 
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time period under consideration. At firm level, we controlled for firm size and degree of 
internationalization. Given our data was pooled over time and involved MNEs from a variety of 
industries we also included year and industry dichotomous dummies (10 year dummies and 10 
industry dummies). Table 2 shows all variables in terms of their definitions and measurement. 
---------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 We employed a binary logistic regression to test our hypotheses. We treated the dataset 
as pooled cross-sectional as our theoretical focus is on examining the likelihood of MNE 
majority ownership as BIT stringency and political instability vary across countries, rather than 
over time. We note that the ratification year for the BITs used in our dataset ranged from 1964 to 
2001, i.e., in time periods before the MNE investments. All variables were entered standardized 
and interaction terms calculated as the product of standardized variables. We ran robustness tests 
by replacing political instability with two other indicators of political uncertainty in the host 
country. These indicators included political constraints, or POLCON (Henisz, 2000) and 
economic freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2015). These are reported below. 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 shows the inter-correlations between variables of interest along with their 
descriptive statistics.  Table 4 presents the results of the main binary logistic regression analysis. 
Multicollinearity is not a concern in this dataset. There are no extremely high inter-correlations 
between independent variables. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were below the cut-off of 10, 
further suggesting that multicollinearity does not interfere with the analysis (Neter, Wasserman, 
& Kutner, 1985: 392). The correlation matrix shows rules encouraging FDI to be negatively 
associated with majority ownership (r=-0.16, p<0.01). Rules encouraging FDI are negatively 
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associated with political instability (r=-0.35, p<0.001). As expected, cultural distance from the 
Netherlands correlates with country size, reflecting the investment interest in countries like 
China and Indonesia in our data (r=0.12, p<0.05), and GDP per capita correlates negatively with 
political instability (r=-0.57, p<0.001). BIT stringency has no significant correlation with 
majority ownership, whereas political instability is negatively correlated (r=-0.10, p<0.1). 
 
---------------------------------- 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 When entering the model alone, the effect of political instability is not significant (Table 
4, Model 2). BIT stringency is also not significant (Model 3). The interaction effect in Model 4 
shows that when political instability increases, highly stringent BITs act to reverse the MNE’s 
preference for minority ownership and make it more likely the MNE will opt for majority 
ownership. At higher levels of political instability greater stringency of a BIT agreement will 
increase the likelihood that MNEs will choose a majority stake.  
 Table 5 shows additional robustness tests. In the first column we see the result when 
political instability is replaced by Henisz’ political constraints measure (POLCON). We 
substituted our measure of political instability taken from the World Governance Indicators with 
an alternate operationalization of political constraints (Bergara, Henisz, & Spiller, 1998; Henisz, 
2000; Henisz & Zelner, 2001).  The political constraints (POLCON) index captures a different 
aspect of a country’s level of political stability, i.e., the likelihood that it will undergo political 
change, by directly measuring the feasibility of a change in policy given the structure of a 
nation’s political institutions (the number of veto points). It assesses the complex relationship 
between veto points and the degree of constraints on policy in the legislative and executive 
branches of government. Alignment across branches increases the feasibility of policy change 
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thereby reducing the level of political constraints and increasing the potential for a government 
turnover. Possible scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (most 
hazardous) to one (most constrained). We reversed this measure (i.e., 1-POLCON) to be 
consistent with our main test and expect a negative sign on the 1-POLCON coefficient as a direct 
effect and a positive sign for the interaction term. We ran an additional robustness test using 
economic freedom (reversed) (Heritage Foundation, 2015). The results are shown in Table 5. 
Figure 1 shows the effects of BIT stringency on the likelihood of MNEs’ preferring majority 
ownership at various levels of political instability. Figures 2 and 3 show the interactions for 
POLCON (reversed) and economic freedom (reversed) respectively.  
---------------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
---------------------------------- 
Figures 1-3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. Discussion  
While previous scholarship has measured the impact of BITs through their presence - by 
using the number of these bilateral agreements in a particular time period or a dummy for BIT 
presence (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; Jandhyala & Weiner, 
2014; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Rose-Ackerman & Tobin, 2005), we break new ground by 
introducing the construct of BIT stringency – a variable capturing differences in the design of 
BITs across the world. This is a more nuanced measurement than the simple presence (and 
count) of BITs and will allow researchers to open up new lines of enquiry into how international 
investment agreement design influences not only FDI flows, but also MNE strategy. While 
scholars have raised awareness of divergence in the content of BITs (Berger et al., 2010; Sachs 
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& Sauvant, 2009; Sornarajah, 2004), there has been a notable gap in research into how the design 
features of these agreements influence MNE strategy. Our study addresses this gap.  
The present study draws attention to the important role played by the design features of 
international investment agreements in influencing MNE internationalization strategy. Prior 
research on MNE strategy has not accounted for these design features. Our specific focus has 
been on the stringency of BIT provisions and our empirical tests support the central argument 
that BIT stringency acts to moderate the relationship between political instability and subsidiary 
ownership choice in host countries. We find that a more stringent BIT will encourage the MNE 
to choose a majority ownership rather than a minority as political instability rises.  
 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
In terms of theory, our study highlights the multi-level nature of the investment 
environment that MNEs must consider while weighing the risks and potential benefits of 
different ownership arrangements under varying conditions of political instability. A stringent 
BIT is most effective at offering a credible commitment against expropriation and providing 
reassurance power that enables majority ownership by MNEs in host countries at higher levels of 
political instability. Our findings show that the design of a risk mitigation structure at an 
international level will influence how the firm views the potential impact of an unstable 
environment at a national level. We provide some support for scholars who have argued that 
investors do take BITs into account when preparing for investment in developing and emerging 
countries (Büthe & Milner, 2014; Sachs & Sauvant, 2009). We also provide support for recent 
advances in institutional theory indicating that events that occur within a nation-state’s 
boundaries can be influenced by activities at other levels, including macro-levels (e.g., at the 
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global level) (De Villa, Rajwani, & Lawton, 2015; Scott, 2014). As Scott noted: “it is 
oversimplifying...to describe nation-states or organizations or their participants as if they were 
operating independently of institutional systems at other levels” (Scott: 2014: 105).  
MNE internationalization is thus constrained by multi-level interactions between factors 
that either present or mitigate risk for MNE investors. This provides support to arguments in the 
tradition of institutional theory that a firm will make key strategic decisions in response to the 
characteristics of different layers of institutional arrangements in which the firm is embedded 
(De Villa, Rajwani, & Lawton, 2015; Scott, 2014). The origin and nature of rule emergence, and 
the environmental concern those rules seek to address together comprise a collective entity that 
determines MNE strategy and action. Strategic investment decisions by the MNE arise as a result 
of interactions between the nature of rule emergence at one level (BIT stringency) and a related 
environmental concern at another level (political instability). The impact of this interaction on 
MNE internationalization decisions illustrates the importance for theorists of avoiding treating 
any one type of external institution as a homogeneous whole, but more qualitatively as a nuanced 
set of design features. 
 
5.2 Managerial and policy implications 
Our study has a number of implications for MNE managers and government policy 
makers. The consistently significant interactions between BIT stringency and country level risk 
conditions show how both uncertainty in the policy environment and international investment 
agreements jointly matter when planning new entries abroad. The decision-making process 
inside the firm requires awareness of constraints and risk mitigation that emanate from different 
institutional levels in the external environment. MNE managers may not need to be too alarmed 
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by the prospect of higher levels of commitments in countries that have started to embark on a 
transition from a politically-unstable past. We think it is important that future work should 
investigate the performance consequences of the observed ownership choices in order to 
comment on performance-optimizing behavior under different levels of BIT stringency.  
In terms of government policy, the findings indicate that host countries that are in an 
early stage of development and that seek inward FDI through foreign-majority-owned 
subsidiaries will achieve this by allowing for more stringent BITs with developed countries. 
Conversely, if the host country has already started a journey of improving political stability, it 
may not need to be too concerned about overly stringent BITs in order to provide reassurance for 
investors. The findings may also have broader implications for global trade and investment 
policy. Given that the number of disputes brought before arbitration has grown enormously in 
recent years – (Sachs & Sauvant (2009) reported that three quarters of all investor – state 
arbitration cases had occurred since 2002) – there is heightened sensitivity around stringency and 
arbitration. For example, the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the US and the EU faces criticism around Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
arbitration issues, including the criticism that too much protection (greater stringency) has been 
given to investors in the past, and less protection to host governments and other stakeholders in 
society. Given the enlarged EU also includes new accession states that are less developed than 
those in north and western Europe, negotiators may consider the stringency effect in the present 
study and argue that less stringency might actually be beneficial as uncertainty in such countries 
diminishes (Figures 1 – 3). This could diffuse some of the criticisms around the use of the ISDS 
system. 
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5.3 Limitations and research implications 
The present study suffers from limitations in a number of areas.  Firstly, the sample was 
taken from one developed country (The Netherlands) and from the investment activities of large 
MNEs listed on the stock exchange in that country. We caution against generalizing the 
implications of our study to MNEs originating in different types of markets (e.g., from 
developing countries) or to smaller internationalizing SMEs or born-globals. Future work can 
test the effect of design of IIAs on much broader samples. Secondly, our main dependent 
variable was ownership structure (majority vs. minority ownership) and not establishment mode 
choice (greenfield vs. acquisition). While it would be interesting in future work to examine the 
impact of BIT stringency on the greenfield vs. acquisition choice, it was not in the scope of our 
study to examine this. Further, we coded ownership as a dichotomous variable. Future work can 
look at the impact of BIT stringency on more fine-grained measurements of ownership such as 
the amount of capital invested and equity position (Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell, 2005). Thirdly, 
a central theme in international business theory is the way MNEs learn and apply their 
experiences to their internationalization choices. We did not account for country-specific 
learning effects or firm-specific learning of the MNE through prior engagement in international 
arbitration or BIT ratification at a country level. How MNEs learn from and influence the design 
of provisions in international investment agreements could be examined in future work. Fourthly, 
our measure of BIT stringency was geared towards obligations related to expropriation risk. 
There may be other instances of international agreements and institutional arrangements in which 
qualitative design features may mitigate a broader range of investment risk. Fifthly, we did not 
differentiate between service vs. manufacturing firms in our sample. Recent research has shown 
that the relationship between BITs and FDI is stronger for investments in fixed capital than other 
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forms of MNE activity (Kerner and Lawrence, 2014) and this distinction could be examined 
further in future work on BIT stringency. 
Finally, our study has implications for researchers investigating the drivers and 
consequences of MNE international strategy in a world of ever-changing institutions. The results 
suggest that researchers should pay close attention not only to the design of domestic but also to 
the design of IIAs when assessing MNE international strategies. Understanding the implications 
of political instability for MNEs cannot rely only on an assessment of domestic political 
environment unilaterally created in host countries. Domestic political environments should not 
be understood without including the international layer of analysis (De Villa, Rajwani, & 
Lawton, 2015; Scott, 2014), or as Keohane and Milner (1999) put it, without “comprehending 
the nature of the linkages between national economies and the world economy” (Keohane & 
Milner 1999: 3). Researchers might need to re-evaluate the importance of different types of 
distance measures in situations where the design of the wider institutional order holds greater 
relevance to MNE investments and the decision-making process behind these investments. These 
factors potentially are much more important when MNEs contemplate new investments in 
countries where national governments have decided to participate in the design of international 
agreements in a way that addresses the concerns of investors under adverse political conditions. 
We encourage future researchers in the field of MNE strategy to pay more attention to the design 
of international investment agreements between home and host countries. 
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Table 1 
Sampled countries grouped by World Bank Governance Indicators political stability percentile rank 
 
< 10 >=10, < 30 >=30, < 50 >=50, < 60 >= 60 
 
Ethiopa 
Nigeria 
Philippines 
 
 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
India 
Indonesia  
Kenya 
Peru 
Russia 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
 
 
Argentina 
China  
Mexico 
South Africa  
Ukraine 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Malaysia 
Mongolia 
Poland 
Romania 
Tunisia 
Vietnam 
 
Belarus 
Costa Rica  
Czech Republic  
Estonia  
Hungary 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Slovakia  
Taiwan 
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Table 2 
Data variables, measurements, definitions and sources. 
 
Variable / Type Measurement Definition Source 
Subsidiary 
Ownership Choice 
/ Dependent 
1 = majority;  
0 = minority 
Parent firm's ownership arrangement in foreign 
direct investment:  majority =  >51%; minority = 
<51% 
AEX-listed MNE annual reports. 2004-2013 
BIT stringency 
/Independent 
Cosine similarity between 
BIT ratified between the 
Netherlands and host 
country and a benchmark 
BIT 
The stringency of the BIT between the two 
countries under which the investment is made 
(See Appendix 1) 
Political 
instability/Indepen-
dent 
Scale from -2.5 to +2.5 
(inverted); higher scores = 
relatively higher political 
instability 
The likelihood that a government will not be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional  
means, including political violence or terrorism 
World Governance Indicators (The World Bank) 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm  
FDI rules/Control Item 6.12 in the GCR; 
scores from 1 to 7 with 
higher values = pro-FDI 
laws  
Business impact rules on FDI: The degree to 
which host countries legislate rules that foster 
foreign direct investment 
Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic 
Forum) 
Cultural 
distance/Control 
Summed squares of the 
variance between host 
country and The 
Netherlands 
National cultural differences between a home & 
host country based on four dimensions 
Hofstede (1980); Kogut & Singh (1988) 
GDP per 
capita/Control 
Log of gross domestic 
product/population 
Economic development of  host country Economist World in Figures, 2006; World Bank Data 
2006 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/) 
Population/Control Log of host country 
population  
The size of the host country’s market in term of 
its population 
Thomson DataStream; World Bank Data  
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/) 
MNE size/Control  Log of total number of 
parent firm’s employees  
Parent firm's size in terms of its worldwide 
employee base 
AEX-listed MNE annual reports.  
Internation- 
alization/Control 
Parent firm’s foreign sales 
as a % of total sales  
The degree to which the parent firm has a 
presence in international markets 
AEX-listed MNE annual reports.  
Host experience / 
control 
1 = prior investment in 
country; 0 = no prior 
investment in country 
Dichotomous variable indicating whether MNE 
has prior investment in the host country within 
period under study 
AEX-listed MNE annual reports. 
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Table 3 
Correlations and descriptive statistics. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ownership 1 1          
BIT stringency 2 -0.04 1         
Political instability 3 -0.10+ 0.07 1        
FDI rules 4 -0.16** -0.07 -0.35*** 1       
Cultural distance 5 0.05 -0.19*** -0.14* 0.11+ 1      
GDP per capita (ln) 6 0.15* -0.18** -0.57*** -0.21*** -0.02 1     
Population (ln) 7 -0.18** 0.03 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.12* -0.47*** 1    
MNE size (ln) 8 -0.05 0.17** 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.14* 0.00 1   
Internationalization 9 0.10+ -0.02 -0.08 0.13* 0.13* -0.05 0.11+ 0.10+ 1  
Host experience 10 0.03 -0.14* 0.05 0.16** -0.02 -0.13* 0.26*** 0.07 0.02  
           
Mean 0.64 0.59 0.45 4.97 4.41 8.12 11.78 10.64 61.65 0.47 
Std. Dev. 0.48 0.02 0.74 0.74 1.75 1.01 1.83 1.66 21.84 0.50 
 
+p<0.1, * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table 4  
Logistic regression results – political instability. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FDI rules -0.43** -0.57** -0.43** -0.66** 
 
(0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.26) 
Cultural distance 0.28+ 0.26 0.26 0.14 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.15 
 
(0.19) (0.25) (0.19) (0.27) 
Population (log) -0.58** -0.51** -0.58** -0.81*** 
 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) 
MNE size (log) 0.09 -0.09 0.10 0.05 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) 
Internationalization -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.25 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Prior host experience 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.58 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) 
Political instability (PI)  -0.26  -0.36 
 
 (0.28)  (0.30) 
BIT stringency (BITSTR)   -0.05 -0.40+ 
 
  (0.15) (0.21) 
PI x BITSTR    0.81*** 
 
   (0.25) 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
     
-2 log likelihood 294.74 293.86 294.62 277.94 
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.29 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All independent and control variables are standardized. 
20 dummy control variables for year and industry included but not shown. 
N=289 
 +p<0.1, * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table 5 
Logistic regression results – additional tests. 
 
  
1-
POLCON 
(DV=Maj. 
Control) 
1-
POLCON 
(DV=Maj. 
Control) 
Economic 
Freedom 
(reversed) 
(DV=Maj. 
Control) 
Economic 
Freedom 
(reversed) 
 (DV=Maj. 
Control) 
Cultural distance 0.33* 0.40+ 0.22 0.34 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.23) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.18 0.1 0.28 0.47* 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) 
Population (log) -0.23 -0.11 -0.90*** -1.14*** 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.29) 
MNE size (log) 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.01 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) 
Internationalization -0.27 -0.25 -0.19 -0.19 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Prior host experience 0.21 0.33 0.31 0.67 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39)+ 
Independent variable (IV) 
(see column header) 
-0.59** -0.65** 0.71** 0.90** 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.33) 
BIT stringency (BITSTR) -0.20 -0.07 0.05 0.15 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) 
IV x BITSTR  0.42+  1.31*** 
 
 (0.23)  (0.29) 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
constant 1.84 1.91 0.87*** 1.79 
 
    
-2 log likelihood 297.14 293.69 235.40 273.65 
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.30 
     
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All independent and control variables are standardized. 
20 dummy control variables for year and industry included but not shown. 
N=289 
 +p<0.1, * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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FIGURES 
 
Fig 1. Moderating Effect of BIT Stringency on the Relationship between Political Instability and 
Ownership 
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Fig 2. Moderating Effect of BIT Stringency on the Relationship between Policy Uncertainty and 
Ownership 
 
  
 
Fig 3. Moderating Effect of BIT Stringency on the Relationship between Lack of Economic 
Freedom and Ownership  
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Appendix 1 
Construction of BIT Stringency Measure 
 
A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is the most common form of an International 
Investment Agreement (IIA) between two countries. A BIT is a legal text document that consists 
of several articles (a primary division of any legal document) and each article typically covers a 
particular issue. Topics concerning expropriation and the written safeguards against potential 
expropriation of assets by a national government tend to be included in a BIT article. This 
expropriation article covers several obligations, such as the type of expropriation, conditions for 
expropriation, types of compensation for expropriation, timing of expropriation, dispute 
settlement procedures, and sometimes treatment of foreign investors during the expropriation 
process. BITs expropriation articles differ in the number of obligations they contain as well as in 
the content of each obligation.  
What we call “BIT stringency” refers to the degree of legal protection against expropriation 
specifically expressed in a BIT articles. The more protection that is stipulated in the BIT article, 
the tighter or higher the BIT stringency. The basis for the new measure of BIT stringency is a 
systematic manual analysis of the content of BIT articles dealing with protection of foreign 
investors against expropriation in host states in the 915 English-language BITs that became 
effective between 1962-2007.  
Building the quantitative dataset from the qualitative textual information involves 
identification of the patterns of similarities and differences of the compared texts, text units. 
Accomplishing this task of pattern identification in BITs’ expropriation articles requires 
identification of specific legal obligations and rights of host states and foreign investors before, 
during, and after proscribed expropriations. Each BIT obligation usually has an identifying key 
word or phrase which is often a specific legal term. Since legally binding international 
documents use extreme caution in choosing the appropriate words and phrases, one key word or 
phrase corresponds to a BIT design feature. Thus, these key phrases for obligations are the basis 
for the classification of BITs’ expropriation provisions into separate categories, each of which 
represents a distinguishable design feature.  
To calculate the BIT stringency as a cosine similarity measure, we undertake several 
steps. First, we identify a benchmark of all existing English-language BITs using as a reference 
those specific provisions in the articles of BITs that maximally protect foreign investors from 
expropriatory actions of host states. These provisions constitute the “ideal” or benchmark BIT. 
Second, each Netherlands BIT is represented as an n-dimensional vector with coordinates taking 
a value of 0 or 1 depending on whether a specific protective provision is present or not in the 
BIT agreement between the dyad of The Netherlands and another country. The cosine coefficient 
measures the cosine of the angle between two n-dimensional vectors. One vector, a mathematical 
representation of an “ideal” BIT, which has all provisions that could maximally protect FDI, has 
all 1s for each dimension-provision protecting FDI. Another vector has 0s or 1s depending on 
whether the corresponding Netherlands BIT includes the provision protecting FDI against 
potential expropriation not. Thus, each BIT dyad (between The Netherlands and another country) 
becomes an n-dimensional vector reflecting whether protective “ideal” provisions are present or 
not. A score that approaches one has relatively more safeguards against potential expropriatory 
actions. The more protective provisions a Netherlands/other country BIT has, the greater its 
similarity to the “ideal” BIT.  
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Appendix 2 
Examples of BIT provisions 
 
Country with 
ratified BIT with 
the Netherlands 
BIT stringency 
coefficient 
Provisions 
Turkey, in force 
since 1989 
0.559 
 
Interpreted as a ‘Less 
Stringent BIT’ 
Expropriation (Article 5):  
 
“Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures 
depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of the other 
Contracting Party of their investments unless the following 
conditions are complied with: (a) the measures are taken in 
the public interest and under due process of law; (b) the 
measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are 
accompanied by provision for the payment of just 
compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the 
fair market value of the investment or in the absence of 
a fair market value the genuine value of the investments 
affected and shall, in order to be effective for the investors, 
be paid and made freely transferable, without unreasonable 
delay, to the country of which the investors concerned are 
nationals or to any other country accepted by the 
Contracting Party concerned and in the currency 
in which the investment was originally made or in any 
freely convertible currency, mutually agreed to by the 
investor and the Contracting Party.” 
 
  
Philippines, in 
force since 1987 
0.618 
 
Interpreted as a 
‘Medium Stringent 
BIT’ 
Expropriation (Article 5):  
 
“Investments or earnings of nationals of either Contracting 
Party shall not be subject to expropriation or nationalization 
or any measure equivalent thereto in this article, all such 
measures are hereafter referred to as ‘expropriation’, except 
for public use, in the public interest, or in the interest of 
national defence and upon payment of just compensation. 
Such compensation shall amount to the market value of 
the investment expropriated, or, in the absence of a 
determinable market value, the actual loss sustained, on 
or immediately before the date of expropriation. The 
compensation shall be made without undue delay, shall be 
effectively realizable and, subject to the provision of 
paragraph 3, Article 7, shall be freely transferable in a 
freely convertible currency to the country designated by the 
national affected. The national affected shall have a right, 
under the law of the Contracting Party making the 
expropriation, to prompt review by a judicial body, 
or, if such exists, by another independent authority of the 
Party of his case and of the valuation of his investment in 
accordance with the principles set out in this paragraph.” 
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Costa Rica, in 
force since 2001 
0.637 
 
Interpreted as a 
‘More Stringent BIT’ 
Expropriation (Article 6): 
  
“1.- Neither Contracting Party will undertake, directly or 
indirectly, measures of nationalization or expropriation, nor 
any other measure having an equivalent effect, against 
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party, 
except in cases when any of such measures have been 
adopted for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, under due process of law, and against prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. 
2.- The compensation shall be paid promptly, it shall 
amount to the fair market value of the investment 
expropriated immediately before expropriation or 
impending expropriation became public knowledge, and 
it shall be effectively realizable and be freely 
transferable. The amount of such compensation shall 
include interest from the date of dispossession of the 
expropriated property until the date of payment, 
according to a normal commercial rate for the currency in 
which it will be paid.” 
 
 
 
 
